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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Monday - 17 May 1971

25X1 1. [] Called Victor Zafra, Legislative Reference Service, OMB, and told him that the Agency had "no objection" to the proposed testimony of Chairman Hampton on the Ervin bill. (The proposed testimony had been cleared with General Counsel and DDS.)

25X1 2. [] Called Fred Miranda, Social Security Administration, in connection with the OMB legislation referral on combining earnings credits under the Social Security and Federal Civil Service Retirement Systems. He explained the background of the measure, indicated that its prospects were not bright at present and said he would get in touch if its prospects improve so that we could assure that appropriate parallel amendments to CIARDS are considered.

25X1 3. [] Met with Miss Mary Lou O'Malley, in the office of Senator Robert Taft, Jr. (R., Ohio), and left with her a suggested reply to a constituent letter from []

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25X1 4. [] Met with Mr. W. H. Boone, House Science and Astronautics Committee staff, who told me the Chairman has requested a conference and possible executive session with the Subcommittee for briefing on the NASA interface with the intelligence community. Chairman Downing is interested in determining what utilization, if any, is made by NASA of information received from the intelligence community and what part it plays in the overall NASA mission. Following this meeting or briefing, Chairman Downing intends an open meeting of the Subcommittee with Dr. Robert Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, and possibly John Foster, OSD DDR&E, on Defense space activities. [] FMSAC, has been advised.

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25X1 5. [] Received a call from []
25X1 [] DIA, who asked whether this Agency had any record of briefings for Representative Olin Teague (D., Texas) at the TKH level. I told her our records indicate several briefings involving this level of material. []
25X1 [] OS, has been advised.

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17 May 1971

MEMORANDUM

Soviet Civil Space Expenditures

Measuring Soviet expenditures for their civil space program is a difficult task. First, the USSR does not release any budgetary data on its space program. We must, therefore, identify individual Soviet space programs and estimate what these programs would cost if conducted in the US to arrive at a total dollar value for the Soviet space effort. Second, the Soviets institutionally do not have a "civil" space program. Rather, their entire space effort is an integrated one encompassing both those programs that in the US would be funded by NASA (civil) and those that would be funded by the Department of Defense (military). What we classify as Soviet "civil" space programs are those that if conducted in the US would be funded by NASA. It is important to note that this is not the way the Soviets themselves view their space expenditures.

Based on our direct observations of the Soviet space program and what the Soviets themselves have said about what they are doing in space, we estimate that their "civil" space ventures will cost them the equivalent of between \$4.5 and \$5 billion in 1971.* This effort amounts to slightly less than 1% of Soviet GNP when measured in ruble terms. The share would be slightly more than 1% measured in dollar terms, but dollars are not an appropriate measure of the burden of the Soviet civil space effort and, of course, are not the measure the Soviets themselves would use. We believe Soviet civil space costs reached their peak about 1968 and have been declining slightly since then. We expect a continued, vigorous Soviet civil space program over the next few years, but probably at funding levels closer to \$4-\$4.5 billion annually.

* Estimates in substantial agreement with this range appeared in a front page article of the Wall Street Journal of 10 March 1971 and the book Soviet Rocketry: Past, Present, and Future by Michael Stoiko; Holt, Rinehart and Winston; 1970.

Within the Soviet "civil" space effort, their space station program is currently receiving the most publicity. As you know, the Soviet *Salyut* vehicle was recently orbited and one attempt has been made to man this platform with a crew from another vehicle. This kind of effort is very expensive. Of course, many of the costs associated with a single space program have utility in various other programs, so identifying specific costs with particular programs is difficult. Nevertheless, we think the Soviet space station program is one of their most expensive current efforts, and will remain so for some time.

The Soviet lunar-planetary exploration programs also have been expensive. Each launch is estimated to cost close to the equivalent of \$50 million. This does not count payload costs, which could well be in the millions, depending upon the nature of the particular mission involved.

Another major cost category is launch vehicle development. Like the US, the Soviets have developed a mixed inventory of launch vehicles. Some of them are outgrowths of missile programs, but the larger and more expensive of which were developed strictly for space missions. The Soviets have experienced considerable problems with these large vehicles. Some of these failures have forced stretchouts in programs, thus adding to their overall long-run costs.

Finally, the Soviets also must bear all of those indirect costs associated with a large space program--administrative expenses, R&D costs not allocable to specified programs, tracking and data acquisition activities, and the like. When summed these expenses represent a significant portion of total Soviet civil space program costs.

12 May 1971

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